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Abstract.
System dynamics was originally founded as a method for modeling and simulating the behavior of industrial 
systems. In recent years it is increasingly employed as a Group Support System for strategic decision-making 
groups. The model is constructed in direct interaction with a management team, and the procedure is generally 
referred to as group model-building. The model can be conceptual (qualitative) or a full-blown (quantitative) 
computer simulation model. In this article, a case is described in which a qualitative system dynamics model 
was built to support strategic decision making in a Dutch government agency.
Since people from different departments held strongly opposite viewpoints on the strategy, the agency had discussed 
its strategic problem for more than a year, but was obviously not able to reach consensus. The application of 
group model-building was successful in integrating opposite points of view, as well as in fostering consensus 
and creating commitment.
The purpose of the article is twofold, first, to illustrate the process of group model-building with system dynamics; 
second, to evaluate why it was successful. Evaluation results reveal the importance of both systemic thinking 
through model-building and the role of the facilitator in catalyzing the strategic decision-making process.
Key Words: group support systems, group facilitation, consensus, commitment, strategic decision making, knowl­
edge elicitation, group model-building
1. Introduction
The number of Group (Decision) Support Systems has increased rapidly over the last dec­
ades. Various authors have made attempts to provide classifications. DeSanctis and Gallupe, 
for instance, distinguish between three levels of GDSS. Level 1 GDSS provide features 
for removing communication barriers in groups; level 2 GDSS contain decision modeling 
and group decision techniques; and level 3 GDSS are characterized by machine-induced 
communication patterns (DeSanctis and Gallupe 1987, pp. 593-594). In this classifica­
tion, all GDSS are assumed to include some kind of computer technology. Ackermann 
and Eden take a wider perspective and make a distinction between Group Decision Support 
Systems which involve direct keyboard entry from group members and those which are 
primarily facilitator driven. The latter are subdivided into systems with and without com­
puter support (Ackermann and Eden 1991; Eden 1992a). System dynamics is a Group Sup­
port System which belongs to the facilitator driven category (Eden 1992b). It was origi­
nally developed by Forrester at M.I.T. as a method for simulating and exploring the behav­
ior of industrial systems as a result of a number of interlocked positive and negative feed­
back loops (Forrester 1961). In the last decade, system dynamics has increasingly been
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applied, both in a qualitative mode (Wolstenholme 1982; Wolstenholme and Coyle 1983; 
Wolstenholme 1990) and in the form of quantitative computer simulation, to support strategic 
decision-making groups (see Morecroft and Sterman 1992). In the qualitative mode, a causal 
diagram (or sometimes a flow diagram) is constructed with a client group, without com­
puter support. The model-building process is facilitated by at least one experienced system 
dynamicist who also acts as the group faciliator. In the quantitative mode, a full-blown 
system dynamics model is constructed and simulated on a computer. This model enables 
the user to reliably explore the dynamic characteristics of the system under study. In this 
situation, which is more complicated to handle, the process is generally guided by at least 
two persons: a group facilitator and an experienced system dynamics model-builder (cf. 
Richardson et al. 1992).
Group model-building can have a number of advantages for strategic decision-making 
groups. First, it is claimed to increase team learning and promote insight into the strategic 
problem (Senge 1990; Lane 1992; Morecroft and Sterman 1992). Many strategic problems 
can be characterized as messy problems. Frequently these defy a clear and straightforward 
definition. Group model-building assists in arriving at a shared understanding of the prob­
lem which the group faces. Second, models are claimed to be excellent communication 
tools (Quade 1982; Meadows and Robinson 1985). They force people to accurately express 
their ideas and opinions and prevent group members from making contributions which 
are highly equivocal. Although equivocality may be useful in maintaining the balance of 
the negotiated social order (Eden 1992a), it can also obstruct the decision-making process 
and affect the quality of decision making (Leathers 1972). The third advantage is that group 
model-building is claimed to create consensus. Research has demonstrated that premature 
consensus and concurrence seeking can have detrimental effects (Janis 1972; Janis and Mann 
1977; Hirokawa 1985; Hirokawa and Rost 1992). However, consensus after careful consid­
eration of the problem and the available alternatives is a very effective way to make deci­
sions, since it generally entails commitment with the decision by the participants in the 
process (Schein 1969).
Only a limited number of studies have tried to empirically evaluate the above claims. 
Empirical evaluation of GSSS is fraught with problems. A number of researchers have 
relied on laboratory experiments, for instance, to evaluate the effectiveness of electronic 
brainstorming (Gallupe et al. 1991) and the role of the facilitator (George et al. 1992). 
Although controlled experiments provide the researcher with the largest degree of control 
over the research situation, the design is generally questioned for its external validity. In 
case of the so-called facilitator-driven systems, experimental evaluation is extremely diffi­
cult if not impossible. Eden (1992c) has argued that these systems cannot be evaluated 
by controlled experiments, primarily because they aim to solve a real problem with real 
managerial teams and they involve a commitment to act. However, controlled experiments 
are not the only way to improve understanding of the effectiveness of a GDSS. Carefully 
conducted case studies can also provide insights into the actual processes taking place, 
as well as the factors promoting success or failure of the GDSS.
In this article, I will follow this approach. A case is presented in which (qualitative) 
system dynamics group model-building was applied to support a strategic decision-making 
process in a Dutch government agency. The agency had discussed its strategic problem 
for more than a year, but had obviously not been able to reach consensus. On the contrary.
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People from different departments held strongly opposite viewpoints, and these seemed 
to become more rigid as time passed. The case demonstrates the complexity and fuzziness 
of the strategic issue and the different types of problems at different levels which had to 
be tackled so as to successfully complete the project. After the description of the case, 
I will discuss the results of an evaluation of the claimed advantages of group model-building, 
as indicated above.
2. Initial contacts with the client organization
Between January 1991 and December 1992,1 was involved in the so-called “Nostradamus” 
management development program at the Directorate General of Public Works and Water 
Management (DGPW). DGPW is a government agency and belongs to the Department 
of Transportation, Public Works, and Water Management (DTPW). Besides DGPW, there 
is a Directorate General for Traffic and Transport (DGTT), and one for Shipping and Mari­
time Affairs (DGSM). The objective of the “Nostradamus” management development pro­
gram in DGPW was to improve the strategic thinking skills of their 25 management teams. 
For this purpose, scenario planning (De Geus 1988; Schoemaker 1993), the hexagon method 
(Hodgson 1992), and (qualitative) system dynamics were used in the training program. 
I was specifically hired by the DGPW to facilitate system dynamics group model-building 
sessions to support strategic discussions within management teams.
Two members of the strategic staff of another Directorate General, i.e., the Directorate 
General for Shipping and Maritime Affairs (DGSM), were also involved in this project 
and attended a couple of system dynamics model-building demonstration sessions. During 
one of the demonstration sessions in March 1992, these two persons approached me, re­
questing whether I was interested in conducting a couple of model-building sessions for 
the Long Term Strategy Group of DGSM. I was told that the issue to be modeled was 
related to the Dutch-registered merchant fleet. For reasons of economy, more and more 
shipowners had restarted to so-called “flags of convenience.” As a result, the number of 
merchant vessels flying the Dutch flag had been steadily decreasing over recent decades. 
In an attempt to reverse this trend, the government had financially supported the Dutch 
fleet in the past. Over the years, however, the financial support program had not proved 
to be successful.
As could be expected, DGSM, carrying responsibility for Shipping and Maritime Affairs, 
was worried about this situation. The Long Term Strategy Group of DGSM (consisting 
of its various unit heads) had been discussing the problem for some time, but had not been 
able to agree on how to solve it. My two spokespersons had the impression that the Long 
Term Strategy Group had not discussed the topic thoroughly enough. After having attended 
the demonstration session, they somehow had the feeling that approaching this problem 
with the aid of system dynamics group model-building would help to make each person’s 
mental model on the issue explicit, provide fresh insights, and potentially generate new 
solutions.
Since, at that moment, we had little time to discuss the matter further, it was agreed 
to have another meeting a couple of weeks later. As a preparation, they sent some relevant 
policy documents.
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3. The problem of the Dutch-registered merchant fleet
For centuries, the Netherlands has been a major maritime nation and has always played 
an important role in the maritime transportation of goods throughout the world. Since World 
War II, however, things have changed dramatically for traditional maritime nations. The 
capacity of the world merchant fleet has increased fourfold, while at the same time the 
U.S. and the European share in this fleet have gradually but persistently decreased. The 
Dutch share in the world fleet decreased from more than 4% to less than 1% in 1990 
(Voorlopige Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat 1992, p. 4). These dramatic changes have, 
among other causes, derived from differences between countries with regard to wage costs, 
fiscal policies, and safety requirements. For economic reasons, many shipowners were com­
pelled to resort to so-called “ flags of convenience” (e.g., Liberia and Panama). In partic­
ular, during the 1960s, competition for the Dutch commercial fleet increased significantly. 
It was, however, not before the beginning of the seventies that the Dutch government adopted 
a policy to protect the Dutch-registered fleet by means of investment premiums and tax 
incentives. The policy seemed a success, because until the mid-1980s the size of the Dutch 
commercial fleet stabilized at about 800 vessels, while at the same time the Northwest 
European fleet decreased by about 50% (in tonnages). However, due to the rapidly decreasing 
economic situation, after the mid-1980s, the Dutch government was forced to introduce 
new financial aid programs in order to encourage vessels to continue to fly the Dutch flag 
and to maintain employment in the maritime sector. In 1987, it was decided to continue 
and further increase the investment premiums on the construction of new vessels and the 
tax exemption program. The latter aimed at reducing gross wage costs of crews. In addi­
tion, a number of regulations regarding crew composition were relaxed. Again, these meas­
ures seemed successful; the decreasing trend in the number of ships flying the Dutch flag 
ceased and even showed a slight reversal in 1990. This recovery did not last, however. 
After 1990, the decline in the size of the Dutch fleet resumed. Once again a new financial 
aid program seemed to be required to reverse this trend. Several studies were conducted 
to identify policies which could increase the viability of the Dutch fleet. These studies 
indicated that the existing investment and tax programs had to be both diversified and ex­
panded to be effective (DGSM 1992).
As my spokespersons told me in the next meeting, however, the political scene had changed 
radically in a couple of years. In contrast to 1987, the government was now much less 
inclined to continue financial support to the Dutch-registered merchant fleet. One reason 
was the large budget deficit which had to be reduced. Another was the fact that in the recent 
past several cases had been made public in which the government had provided large sums 
of subsidies to insolvent companies. In retrospect, these proved to be a waste of the tax­
payer’s money. Since financial aid programs for the Dutch fleet had not been very success­
ful in the past, the secretary of the Department of Transportation and Public Works (DTPW) 
was probably afraid of being accused of “pouring the taxpayer’s money down the drain.” 
By the end of 1991, the financial support program was drawing near the end of its term. 
Both the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of DTPW seriously considered ceasing 
financial aid to the Dutch-registered merchant fleet.
A number of people in DGSM regarded this as a hasty decision. They considered it 
impossible that the government would be able to estimate the potential consequences of
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such a radical resolution. In their opinion, the problem would have to be analyzed more 
rigorously before such an important decision could be warranted. As stated, my spokes­
persons felt that this might be accomplished by applying system dynamics model-building 
to the problem.
4. The group model-building sessions
However, time was limited. Since the secretary of DTPW had suggested stopping the financial 
aid program and a decision by the Lower and Upper Chambers was approaching, my spokes­
persons wanted to start the project as soon as possible, and preferably to finish it within 
a couple of weeks. As a result, there was no opportunity to prepare the group model-building 
sessions by means of interviews or questionnaires, as is frequently the case (see Richmond 
1987; Vennix et al. 1990). Instead, three group model-building sessions of three hours 
each were planned in April and May 1992. It was agreed that after three sessions the situa­
tion would be evaluated and a decision would be made as to whether or not to continue 
model-building. To further speed up the model-building process, the three sessions would 
be interspersed with workbooks. Workbooks can be considered as a special kind of ques­
tionnaire with a flexible format, in which participants are invited to perform certain tasks 
(e.g., brainstorm variables) and to provide comments on submodels which have been devel­
oped in the sessions (see Vennix and Gubbels 1994). Normally these workbooks are designed 
by the project group, but in this case one of my two spokespersons, who acted as the Long 
Term Strategy Group’s secretary, took care of this. This person also acted as a gatekeeper 
during the project (Richardson et al. 1992; Eden and Simpson 1989, p. 65-66).
4.1. The first session
Since the group was not familiar with system dynamics, I started the first session with 
a brief one-hour introduction to system dynamics and group model-building. The presenta­
tion was illustrated by an example of a previous project, in order to demonstrate to group 
members what was expected from them and what they, in turn, could expect from the 
sessions.
After this short introduction, I started the group model-building process by introducing 
the problem of the declining size of the Dutch-registered merchant fleet. This immediately 
gave rise to a heated debate in which several persons indicated that this was only a minor 
problem and that, instead of addressing it, the group should focus on more important prob­
lems related to the Dutch coast and Dutch ports. Gradually it became clear to me that there 
were truly divergent perspectives within the division about its preferred strategy.
In fact, only one group, i.e ., the Sea Fleet Policy Unit within DGSM, was most worried 
about the “decreasing fleet size problem.” This unit is largely responsible for the Dutch- 
registered merchant fleet. Termination of the financial aid program would jeopardize their 
position within the DGSM. In addition, many within this unit felt that support for the Dutch 
fleet could not just simply be abandoned, since in the long run this would mean giving 
up the historic position of the Netherlands as a maritime nation. People within the Sea
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Fleet Policy Unit felt strongly that something needed to be done to stop the reduction in 
the numbers of vessels flying the Dutch flag. As early as the beginning of 1991, the unit 
had started to prepare a policy document in order to find renewed governmental support 
for the Dutch fleet.
However, in addition to the Dutch commercial fleet, DGSM is responsible for two other 
strategic areas. The first is related to the Dutch ports (i.e., Rotterdam and Amsterdam) and 
involves such tasks as accomplishing further innovation in the ports, maintaining safety, 
and gearing activities and transportation modalities to one another. The second area con­
cerns the advancement of safe and swift shipping traffic on the North Sea. Some of the 
people involved in these latter two strategic areas had strong doubts about the viability 
of the Dutch commercial fleet. They basically agreed with the secretary of DTPW’s posi­
tion of abandoning government support and were not inclined to back up the policy docu­
ment prepared by the Sea Fleet Policy Unit. In their view, the Dutch fleet was “history,” 
and the other two strategic issues would prove to be much more critical in a rapidly chang­
ing world. Rather than a large commercial fleet, they believed that such matters as telematics, 
logistics, and floor-to-floor management would become increasingly important. As a result, 
these people proposed to cease interference with the Dutch fleet altogether in order to be 
able to more fully concentrate future activities of the agency on the other two strategic areas.
By the beginning of 1992, this discussion had lasted for more than a year, and the Long 
Term Strategy Group obviously had not reached a consensual decision. Quite the opposite, 
it seemed that over time arguments and positions had become more rigid. This clearly 
surfaced during the first group model-building session when I introduced the problem to 
be modeled. Not only was there a heated debate about this issue, but some persons even 
refused to take the “decreasing Dutch fleet” problem as a starting point for model-building. 
It looked as if the discussion would get stuck at the start of the first session.
In order to overcome this deadlock, I asked several group members why they considered 
the “ fleet problem” unimportant. Their answers suggested to me that they saw it as an 
isolated phenomenon, unrelated to the other two strategic problems. I told the group that 
from a systems perspective, it would probably make little difference which of the three 
strategic issues was taken as a starting point for group model-building. Most probably, 
the three would prove to be interrelated. I argued that whatever strategic issue was taken 
as a starting point, the other issues would almost automatically come into focus during 
construction of the model. This (at least temporarily) convinced most of the sceptical group 
members, and a deal was made that if “their problems” did not surface within a couple 
of sessions the issue would be rediscussed. As a result, the problem of the Dutch-registered 
merchant fleet was taken as the preliminary starting point.
During this discussion, I had also noted that group members held ideas and opinions 
which were rather rigid, something which frequently happens when a group is not able 
to reach a consensual decision. In such cases, people generally increase their efforts to 
convince others of the correctness of their viewpoint, which generally produces the oppo­
site effect. As a result, the group had a communication problem: people hardly listened 
to each other’s arguments and made frequent interruptions. In order to break through this 
ineffective communication pattern, I employed elements from the Nominal Group Technique 
(Delbecq et al. 1975) to start the model-building process. The NGT approach for group 
model-building consists of the following steps.
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After defining the initial problem, participants are invited to generate relevant variables 
in silence and to write them down. After the group has finished this step, the facilitator 
invites group members in a round-robin fashion to name one variable from their list. Each 
variable is written on a magnetic hexagon (Hodgson 1992) and put on a white board (see 
left-hand part of Figure 1). When no more variables are generated, the facilitator starts 
building the causal diagram by selecting the problem variable (in our case the “number 
of ships flying the Dutch flag”) and putting it on a separate white board. Next (s)he asks 
participants to identify the causes for increases or decreases in the number of ships, by 
looking at the list of generated variables. These are then transferred to the other white board 
and built into the diagram, as can be seen in the right-hand part of Figure 1.
Arrows denote causal relationships between variables, where a “ + ” sign means a posi­
tive, and a sign a negative effect. In Figure 1, the variable, “number of ships flying 
Dutch flag,” shows only incoming arrows. (These are the potential causes of the problem.) 
The arrows can be read as follows: “the more (less) available capital, the more (less) invest­
ment decisions will be made. This leads to a higher (lower) number of new ships in the 
Dutch fleet and hence to a larger (smaller) number of ships flying the Dutch flag.” Note 
that all individual relationships between two variables are valid under the “ceteris paribus” 
clause, i.e., they are valid if the other variables are simultaneously kept unchanged.
Having finished this step, the facilitator then asks the group to consider the consequences 
of changes in the problem variable, again by looking at the list of variables. These will 
show in the diagram as arrows “leaving” the problem variable. Simultaneously, the facilitator 
invites the group to look for connections between consequences and causes, i.e., conse­
quences which, in turn, can be considered as causes of the “original” causes. This will 
lead to the identification of potential feeback loops, which constitute the core of system 
dynamics models. The latter two steps will be illustrated in the next sections.
Dutch finan­
cial climate
number of 
ships flying 
Dutch flag
investment
decisions
available technical 
capital depreciation
r I  / 'M arket ^ I Hprrpase
new vessels 
Dutch fleet
Mark
development 
shipping 
industry,
dec e  
size of 
Dutch fleet
Figure I. E xam ple o f  use o f hexagons in system dynam ics g roup m odel-building.
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As a consequence of the introduction and the discussion on which problem to model, 
the actual model-building time in the first session was limited. The session ended with 
a causal diagram (Figure 2) which merely identified a number of causes of the decreasing 
number of ships flying the Dutch flag.
This diagram was sent to the group members with a couple of accompanying tasks in 
the form of a small workbook. Three tasks had to be performed. First, the participant was 
asked to further complete the diagram; second, to indicate which variables represented 
the most urgent problems for DGSM; and, finally, to identify potential consequences of 
a decrease in the Dutch fleet’s size. In previous projects, I had always had good experiences 
with workbooks as a means of speeding up the model-building process and of preparing 
participants for the next session (see Vennix and Gubbels 1994; Akkermans et al. 1993). 
Unfortunately, in this case, only two out of nine participants reacted to the questions. One 
of the potential reasons for this lack of cooperation was that persons were trying to protect 
their positions by an attempt to postpone or prevent a strategic decision’s being taken by 
the organization. Although the number of reactions was disappointing I proceeded as usual 
and added the changes made in the diagrams contained in the two workbooks to the causal 
diagram that had resulted from the first session. This adapted diagram was taken as a start­
ing point for the second session.
technical/economic
depreciation
Figure 2. Causal diagram after first session: causes of problem.
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4.2. The second session
Another problem was that some persons were a little reluctant to participate in the sessions. 
They did not attend the second session but (at our specific request) sent substitutes. Although 
this disturbed the process, it also proved beneficial in the longer run, because more persons 
from DGSM got involved in the strategic discussion, often leading to new and fresh perspec­
tives on the matter. The second session was started with the adapted diagram from the 
first session. The basic idea was to improve the diagram and, in particular, to focus on 
the consequences of the decreasing fleet size. However, one of the substitutes, who was 
very knowledgeable about the process of investment by shipowners, came up with a more 
detailed diagram of the investment decision process of shipowners. I invited him to present 
it to the group. After having discussed his diagram, the discussion shifted to the question 
of the consequences of the decreasing size of the Dutch fleet for the DGSM organization. 
At this point, the discussion waned. Obviously, thinking of likely future consequences is 
more difficult than suggesting causes of a problem (see Russo and Schoemaker 1989). In 
order to stimulate thinking about this issue, I made the group conduct a “mental simula­
tion” (Kahneman and Tversky 1982; Sims 1986), by asking the following question: “Sup­
pose that the number of vessels flying the Dutch flag were gradually, but within a few 
years, to decrease to zero. What do you think would happen?” This question helped to 
produce some interesting reactions. It was felt by the group that a distinction had to be 
made between the effects of having no vessels flying the Dutch flag versus having no vessels 
being managed in the Netherlands. In addition, potential effects for DGSM were separated 
from those for the maritime policy area. A four-cell matrix was applied in order to arrange 
potential consequences, as can be seen in Figure 3.
With regard to the causal diagram, only the lower half of the matrix is important, since 
it shows the potential effects of a sharp decline in the size of the fleet flying the Dutch 
flag. We started including these potential effects (of the lower half of the matrix) in the
Effects For
Decrease in Size of DGSM Organization Maritime Policy Area
Dutch-managed fleet • weaker position within DTPW
• loss of technical/nautical know-how
• smaller organization
• weaker international influence
• decrease contribution to GNP
Fleet flying the Dutch flag • smaller organization
• loss of technical/nautical know-how
• weaker position of DGSM within 
DTPW
• less “qualitative” departments
• increase in attention to Dutch ports 
and Dutch coast
• decrease contribution to GNP
• weaker position in international 
maritime organizations
• increase in attention to Dutch ports 
and Dutch coast
• loss of sailors (with consequences 
for maritime education)
• loss of technical/nautical know-how
Figure 3. Potential effects of a decrease in the size of (1) a Dutch-managed fleet, and (2) merchant fleet flying 
the Dutch flag for (a) DGSM and (b) the maritime polity area in general.
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diagram. Some of these were rather straightforward and easy to include. Some were more 
difficult, because there was no consensus on them. A couple led to the identification of 
(what would later prove to be crucial) feedback loops. The effects on the number of sailors, 
the Dutch economy (balance of payments), and the loss of technical know-how were rather 
straightforward. Most of the discussion focused on the effects on the position of DGSM 
within the Department of Transportation and Public Works (DTPW). Of course, this posi­
tion is determined by all three strategic areas: the size of the ports, the maritime traffic 
on the North Sea, and the size of the Dutch fleet. With regard to this latter variable, the 
group was convinced that a sharp decrease in the size of the Dutch-registered merchant 
fleet would undermine the strength of the position of the division within the department 
of DTPW. In addition, it would decrease the size of DGSM itself, which would further 
reinforce the latter process. The weakened position of DGSM would, in turn, lead to a 
further decline in the Dutch fleet, because it was felt that no other agency had the appropri­
ate network or experience to develop effective policies for it. As a result of these discus­
sions, two positive feedback loops emerged in the diagram, as can be seen in Figure 4. 
The loops are indicated by the bold arrows.
Figure 4. Causal diagram after second session: consequences of problem.
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This figure is the result of the discussion on the consequences of a decreasing Dutch- 
fleet size. The two positive feedback loops indicate a self-reinforcing process, i.e., a process 
of a declining fleet will reinforce itself and hence lead to a further reduction in the fleet 
size. Due to the emergence of these feedback loops, the first real doubts arose within the 
whole group about abandoning support for the Dutch fleet, since in the long run this might 
undermine the strength of DGSM within DTPW, as well as their influence in international 
organizations. This, in turn, might affect the potential to carry out the other two strategic 
tasks effectively. Although these latter thoughts did not yet neatly materialize in the above 
diagram, it started to dawn in people’s minds that the three strategic areas were more closely 
interrelated than they were previously inclined to believe. For those who were still in doubt, 
this notion would be strongly reinforced in the third session by another feedback loop which 
was to emerge in the diagram.
4.3. The third session
One of the effects in the matrix, which had not been discussed in the second session, was 
the tacitly assumed increase in DGSM’s attention to the other two strategic tasks (i.e., ports 
and coast), once no more attention would have to be given to the Dutch fleet. However, 
no consensus could be reached on plausible causal links to be put in the causal diagram 
to support this notion. Quite the contrary was the case. The discussions and the emerging 
feedback loops were suggesting that the smaller the Dutch fleet the more difficult it would 
be to carry out the other strategic tasks. This conjecture, which had already surfaced by 
the end of the second session, was now strongly reinforced by a new feedback loop, which 
emerged in the diagram as a result of the discussions in this third session. Until 1992, 
support for the Dutch fleet had primarily been defended because of its direct contribution 
to the Dutch economy through shipbuilding and repair yards, employment in the ports, 
training of crews, etc. In the third session, a new notion was added to this argument, while 
discussing the role of the Netherlands in the whole logistical chain of storage, transship­
ment, and distribution in Europe. Some people argued that a strong reduction in the number 
of vessels flying the Dutch flag would in the long run lead to an outflow of a number of 
shipowners. Without Dutch shipowners, the amount of maritime traffic through the Nether­
lands, and the size of the Dutch transportation sector, would also decline. As a consequence, 
this would reduce the distribution function of the Netherlands in Europe. This, in turn, 
would impede the growth of the Dutch ports, further weakening DGSM’s position within 
DTPW, thus leading to a further decrease in the number of ships flying the Dutch flag 
and concomitantly to a declining contribution to the Dutch GNP, as can be seen in Figure 
5. Again the important feedback loop is indicated by bold arrows.
Figure 5 contains the final diagram detailing the potential consequences of a decreasing 
fleet size, as it existed at the end of the third session. From a model builder’s perspective, 
the causal diagram is not really finished. There are, for instance, several “open loops,” 
and the submodels (e.g., Figures 2 and 4) are not integrated into one overall model. In 
addition, no efforts were made to quantify the conceptual model. However, as stated earlier, 
we had previously agreed that at the end of the third session a decision would be made 
as to whether or not to continue the model-building process. Although some persons agreed
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Figure 5. Causal diagram after third session.
with me that the model was not finished, the majority of the group felt that no further 
sessions were required, a situation which is not uncommon in group model-building (see, 
for instance, Lane 1992; Wolstenholme 1992).
By the end of the third session, three important conclusions stood out. The first was 
that abandoning support for the Dutch fleet would most probably jeopardize DGSM’s posi­
tion within DTPW. Second, the indirect contribution of the Dutch fleet to the economy, 
by enhancing the Dutch position as a distributor of goods to Europe, proved to be far more 
important (particularly in the future) than its direct economic contribution. Third, without 
a Dutch commercial fleet, it would be hard for the Netherlands to maintain its role in inter­
national trade as a distributor of goods for Europe.
These three insights changed several people’s minds and helped to create consensus within 
the Long Term Strategic Group about the appropriateness of trying to find ways to con­
tinue governmental support for the Dutch fleet. In a sense, the whole group was now ready 
to back up the policy document from the Sea Fleet Policy Unit, which the latter had ini­
tiated at the beginning of 1991.
5. The policy document
What happened to the causal diagrams and how was the strategic decision-making process 
affected? As stated, the diagrams were never revised or neatly redrawn,, nor has there ever 
been an attempt to formalize and quantify the causal model into a full-blown system dynam­
ics simulation model. In parallel with the system dynamics sessions, the Long Term Strategic 
Group was still discussing the structure and contents of the final version of the policy docu­
ment designed to get support for the Dutch fleet, which was to be presented to the Secretary.
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This policy document was published in September 1992, about four months after the last 
session (DGSM 1992). Interestingly enough, there is also a draft version of this policy 
document dating back to January 1991, more than one and one-half years before. This 
document was produced by the Sea Fleet Policy Unit, but it was not supported by the whole 
DGSM organization, as we have indicated in section 4.1. It was precisely this document 
about which no consensus within the Long Term Strategy Group could be reached. Com­
paring both policy documents leads to a couple of interesting findings and demonstrates the 
way in which the model-building sessions affected the strategic decision making process. 
As might be expected, the contents of both policy documents largely overlap. However, 
there are also a couple of significant arguments in the final version which are missing in 
the draft version. These arguments can, at least in part, be traced back to the discussions 
in the group model-building sessions and the causal diagrams.
The first is related to the influence of the Netherlands in international maritime organiza­
tions. In discussing safety and environmental matters and the role of various international 
organizations, the policy document emphasizes that:
The strong international character of the maritime sector constrains the possibilities of 
self-regulation by the industry. International organizations, like the International Mari­
time Organization (IMO) of the United Nations, are required to arrive at international 
agreements. The size of a national fleet determines to a large degree the influence a 
country can exert on decision making within these organizations (DGSM 1992, p. 7, 
translation J.V.).
The second is that the final verison contains at least six references to the importance 
of the role of the Netherlands as a distribution country and its importance for the Dutch 
economy. It is also clearly argued that this function can only be maintained by means of 
a Dutch fleet.
And in particular a modem, high quality Dutch fleet with the shipowner as logistic ser­
vice agent is of great importance for the further reinforcement of the Dutch distribution 
function for Europe (DGSM 1992, p. 9). And:
For a number of flows of goods the shipowner is the director of the logistical chain 
( .. .) . From their role as worldwide carriers they attempt to direct as many flows through 
the Netherlands as possible, because they also have financial interest in Dutch transship­
ment and distribution companies. This will strengthen the position of “Netherlands dis­
tribution country” as gateway to Europe (DGSM 1992, p. 10)
The importance of the latter arguments is reinforced by the fact that these are specifically 
mentioned by the Secretary in her letter accompanying the policy document to the Lower 
Chamber:
The Netherlands has always been an important maritime trading nation. Shipping is 
an essential link in “Holland distribution country.” Strengthening this distribution function 
can best be accomplished if shipping activities are tied with the Netherlands. In order 
to accomplish this it is necessary to maintain ships flying the Dutch flag.
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In other words, the Secretary, at first unwilling to continue support to the Dutch fleet 
was now arguing that financial support was necessary in order for the Netherlands to be 
able to fulfill a significant distribution function for Europe. Obviously, the arguments pro­
duced in the policy document (combined with the lobbying efforts of a number of shipowners) 
had aided in convincing both the Secretary of Finance and DTPW to reconsider their original 
position to abandon the financial aid program. This is not to say that they had uncritically 
changed their minds and were now suddenly inclined to provide unlimited support to the 
Dutch fleet. The Secretary of DTPW also pointed out that in the long run the Dutch fleet 
ought to be fully competitive and that this type of financial support program had to be 
made redundant. In order to accomplish this, it was also proposed that international agree­
ments had to be negotiated to abolish financial aid programs in maritime countries in the 
future. As a result, the policy document suggested providing financial support for a limited 
time period of five years.
The policy document was used as a basis for the decision in the Lower and Upper Cham­
bers. Obviously, the arguments in the document were also convincing to the members of 
these two chambers, because they decided to agree with a financial support to the Dutch- 
registered merchant fleet amounting to about dfl. 150 million per year for a limited period 
of five years.
6. Contributions from the group model-building process
At the end of the process, there were at least two tangible results. First, as participants 
indicated on a questionnaire, there was a high level of consensus and commitment with 
regard to the strategic choice, something which was clearly lacking at the beginning of 
the process. Second, as a result of this, DGSM gained a financial support of dfl. 150 million 
per year to protect the Dutch fleet.
The interesting question is to what degree and how system dynamics group model-building 
contributed to this success. In the remainder of this article, I will try to answer this ques­
tion. The answer will be based on discussions with the gatekeeper, my own observations 
of the process, and, last but not least, on the participants’ opinions about the process. These 
opinions were elicited by means of a questionnaire filled out by those who attended at least 
two of the three sessions. The questionnaire contains a number of Likert items, and respon­
dents were requested to indicate their opinions on a five-point scale ranging from “strongly 
agree” to “strongly disagree.” In my view, three factors are responsible for the success 
of this project. These three factors partially relate to the most important problems which 
this particular group was facing at the start of the project. The first is that the model-building 
process produced new and fresh insights into the strategic issues. Second, the process aided 
in improving the quality of communication within the group. Third, the group model-building 
process was successful in fostering consensus and commitment to the final decision. Let 
us look at each of these factors in more detail.
6.1. Creating new insights: the role of systemic thinking
The first contribution of the process is that it generated a couple of new and fresh insights. 
Six (out of nine) persons agree that the group model-building process changed their opinions
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about the problem, while two persons disagree with this statement, and one neither agrees 
nor disagrees. Seven persons agree, and one strongly agrees, that the group model-building 
process increased their insight into the problem. Eight participants agree that the process 
generated new insights into the problem. These concern insights into the causes of the prob­
lem, its consequences, and the way to deal with it.
To an outsider these results might look strange. A sceptic might, for instance, argue that 
it is hard to imagine that people would not have been aware of the importance of the Nether­
lands as a distribution country and of the fact that shipowners play a role in this process. 
It would be difficult to deny this. One of the beneficial effects of the group model-building 
process, however, was that it restructured existing, but scattered, knowledge by putting 
it in a systemic perspective. It thus revealed relationships between various elements, and, 
thereby, created new knowledge for the group. A lack of systemic perspective was, for in­
stance, demonstrated in the discussion which took place in the first session concerning 
which problem to select for the model-building sessions. An indication of this can also 
be found in an answer from one participant to a question in one of the workbooks: “No, 
we know almost everything there is to know about this subject, but I have the feeling that 
we do not interrelate all that we know in an appropriate way.”
The above speculation is confirmed by the results of the questionnaire. All participants 
agree that the process occasioned a more holistic approach to the problem. Two persons 
agree strongly, and five agree, that the process revealed relationships between elements 
of the problem. In these answers, the contribution of a systemic approach by means of 
system dynamics clearly surfaces. The causal diagrams obviously revealed the subtle inter­
relatedness of the three strategic areas in which DGSM is involved. In that sense, the proc­
ess also aided in creating a shared understanding of the problem. Two persons agree strongly, 
and six agree, while one neither agrees nor disagrees with this assessment. Interestingly 
enough, although the diagrams clearly contain a number of feedback loops, only three per­
sons agree that they gained more insight into the role of feedback processes in the problem. 
Three persons disagree with this, and three neither agree nor disagree. One reason for 
this might be that, although the structure of the feedback processes is known, it is extremely 
difficult to assess their dynamic consequences, particularly if they are interrelated.
6.2. Improving the quality of communication
Another important, maybe even critical, contribution of the group model-building process 
is the improvement of the quality of communication within the group. As stated, prior to 
the group model-building sessions, discussions in the Strategy Group were clearly charac­
terized by ineffective communication. People in the Long Term Strategy Group hardly lis­
tened to one another, and made frequent interruptions. Empirical research has indicated 
that low-quality communication negatively affects group performance (Fouriezos, Hutt, and 
Guetzkow 1950; Gibb 1960; Leathers 1972). These results are corroberated by this case. 
The Long Term Strategy Group had discussed their strategic plans for more than a year 
without making any real progress. Hence, one of the first prerequisites for improving per­
formance within this group was to enhance the quality of group communication. This was 
accomplished in several ways. First, by the use of structured group process techniques (e.g.,
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NGT). Various studies have shown the detrimental effect of mixing up brainstorming and 
evaluation tasks (Brilhart and Jochem 1964; Maier and Thurber 1969). In addition, employ­
ing causal diagrams in front of the group creates a visual group memory, helping to retain 
the flow of the group discussion. Finally, the facilitator can foster an open communication 
atmosphere by reinforcing supportive communication and avoiding defensive communica­
tion (Gibb 1960).
Obviously the above procedures were effective. According to the participants, the group 
model-building process aided in improving communication in three respects. First, six out 
of nine group members (strongly) agree that it provided an equal opportunity for all group 
members to express their opinions. Three persons hold the opinion that discussions were 
conducted in a structured fashion and that there were no really dominant talkers, four per­
sons neither agreed nor disagreed with these statements, and one person disagreed. Second, 
six people agreed (strongly) that group model-building aided in explaining one’s ideas to 
others in the group. A couple of respondents also pointed out that the model-building proc­
ess makes it impossible to “hide behind vague statements” and to obstruct the discussion. 
As stated before, constructing causal diagrams obviously forces persons to express their 
ideas more accurately. When it comes to the issue of mutual understanding, seven par­
ticipants agree that model-building helped to better understand other people’s ideas and 
opinions. Eight acknowledge that it provided more insight into the ideas of other group 
members. Finally, according to eight participants, employing causal diagrams as a way 
of capturing people’s ideas helped to improve the quality of communication.
6.3. Creating consensus and commitment
Probably the most important result is that the group model-building sessions were success­
ful in fostering consensus. In addition, they created commitment to the decision to attempt 
to obtain financial support for the Dutch-registered merchant fleet. Eight persons agree 
that consensus was reached and that group model-building is an appropriate method for 
integrating different viewpoints. When it comes to commitment, three persons agree, and 
two strongly agree, that they fully stick to the conclusions which were formulated. Two 
persons neither agree nor disagree, and one person disagrees.1
In part, consensus and commitment were created through the systemic insights gained 
during the model-building process. The notion that abandoning the Dutch fleet might in 
the long run have serious repercussions for the whole DGSM organization must have helped 
to create this consensus. Commitment was also affected by appropriate facilitation behavior. 
Vennix et al. (1993) evaluated four different group model-building projects, which included 
this case. Their data suggest that the facilitator is probably the most important factor in 
creating commitment to the decision. Moreover, in all four projects, participants indicated 
that in their opinion, it was the facilitator who contributed most to the overall success of 
the project. These results are in agreement with other research in the GDSS field (see 
Bostrom et al. 1993; Clawson et al. 1993). Since the facilitator role seems so important, 
let us finally take a brief look at this aspect of group model-building.
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6.4. Effective group faciliation
Several authors discuss critical skills for effective group facilitation (see, for instance, 
Clawson et al. 1993; Phillips and Phillips 1993). In this section, I will briefly discuss a 
number of attitudes and skills which, in my view, are helpful in concluding a project suc­
cessfully, as described in this article. For a more elaborate description of group facilitation 
in system dynamics group model-building, I refer the reader to Vennix (1995).
One important factor is a helping and problem-oriented attitude. The crucial idea is that 
a good facilitator wants to help a group solve a (strategic) problem rather than build a model. 
All the behavior of an effective facilitator has to be guided by this idea. And, as this case 
demonstrates, this is more difficult than it might initially appear to be. Although it originally 
looked to me as if there were an unambiguous problem to be modeled, the first session 
clearly proved the opposite. The discussion about what problem to model is part of the 
process and part of the deliverable (see Lane 1992). Although this problem was “solved” 
by the suggestion that, in a systemic approach, strategic areas would prove to be interre­
lated, another equally (or maybe even more) important problem was still left—namely, that 
of low-quality communication in the group. As stated, the latter is a real obstacle for effec­
tive group performance. Hence, not only has an effective facilitator to be problem oriented, 
in the sense that (s)he wants to aid in solving a strategic problem, but also sensitive to, 
and work simultaneously at, other problems which impede group performance. In that sense, 
a facilitator should be aware that the group interaction aspect of strategy formulation is 
frequently more important than the analytical aspect (Eden 1992a).
Another important factor in this case was the neutrality of the facilitator with regard 
to the content of discussion. Being neutral implies that a facilitator does not take sides 
in the discussions. It also means that any group member can air his/her opinions without 
the facilitator revealing his/her favor or disfavor with regard to the content of what is said, 
regardless how strange certain ideas might look at first sight and regardless of the person 
who expresses them. This approach proved to be beneficial, since, in this case, most group 
members held strong opinions and were hardly inclined to listen to other group members. 
Particularly when there are strong opposing points of view, contributing to content entails 
the danger that one “. . .  may become drawn into the group’s deliberations and may soon 
be treated as another participant” (Phillips and Phillips 1993, p. 534). The latter will weaken 
one’s position as a facilitator.
A skill which also proved to be beneficial in this case, given the differences of opinion 
and the fact that people did not really listen, was reflective listening. This skill entails being 
able to ask clarifying questions in order to make sure that you and (maybe even more im­
portantly) other group members understand what is said. In general, people in small groups 
have the tendency to provide answers and to give critique and opinions, rather than ask 
questions (see, for instance, Hare 1962, p. 66), although one frequently feels that there is 
miscommunication. Jensen and Chilberg (1991, p. 86) and Rees (1991, p. 57) suggest some 
guidelines which will help in active listening, some of those are: to avoid distractions, to 
demonstrate that you are listening, not to interrupt, and to avoid thinking ahead to what you 
are going to say. An effective way of accomplishing reflective listening is to ask questions 
and to reflect back what one (thinks one) has heard by sentences such as: “so, what you 
are saying is. . .” or “you mean that. . . .” This type of statement will often serve to prevent 
miscommunication and to foster a climate in which people will listen to each other’s ideas.
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Another important skill for a facilitator is being able to increase the level of vigilance 
in the group. Field and laboratory studies have shown the dangers of groupthink (Janis 
1972; Janis and Mann (1977)) and have demonstrated that vigilance in group decision making 
is more important than type of decision making sequence (Brilhart and Jochem 1964; Bayless 
1967; Larson 1969; Hirokawa 1985; Hirokawa and Rost 1992). One of the great advan­
tages of constructing causal diagrams is that it almost automatically forces the group to 
think critically about their problem and that it challenges hidden assumptions. One clear 
example from this case is the assumption that abandoning the Dutch fleet would lead to 
more effort's being put into the other two strategic tasks of DGSM. Causal modeling helped 
to uncover and refute this tacit assumption. It demonstrated that exactly the opposite was 
true namely, that less interference with the Dutch fleet would lead to more difficulty in 
carrying out the other two tasks. Clearly, respondents agree with the fact that model-building 
forces group participants to think thoroughly about the strategic problem. Two persons 
agree strongly, and seven agree with the statement: “The model-building process encouraged 
us to think thoroughly about our problem.”
Finally, it is important that a facilitator be able to create consensus and commitment. 
Active listening and showing a genuine interest in a person’s opinions were extremely helpful 
in this case. Another point in this respect is to conduct the model-building sessions in such 
a way that the model is owned by the group (Roberts 1978; Phillips and Phillips 1993). 
If this is the case, there is a certain degree of consensus about the problem, which is a 
prerequisite for commitment and implementation. From the perspective of ownership, it 
is important to involve the group as much as possible in the model-building process. Some­
times, group members step forward and start restructuring the model. For instance, this 
was the case in the second and the third sessions. I consider these as moments when the 
client starts really owning the model, and I generally encourage this type of situation rather 
than trying to “stay in control.” However, this might prove difficult sometimes, because 
as Keltner (1989) points out, one of the paradoxes of facilitation is that by teaching the 
group how to help itself, the facilitator essentially eliminates his own role. But, in fact, 
the facilitator is accomplishing what a good facilitator should achieve: the group starts help­
ing itself!
7. Discussion and conclusions
In larger organizations differences of opinion frequently exist between members of differ­
ent departments. A manager’s view of the organization and its problems is powerfully deter­
mined by his or her place in the organization (Dearborn and Simon 1958; March and Simon 
1958). Hall (1984) has clearly demonstrated the potential detrimental effects of “local” 
viewpoints in a case study of the demise of the Saturday Evening Post. One technique for 
circumventing the problem of “partial viewpoints” is group model building with system 
dynamics. In this article, I have described a successful application of group model-building 
for creating consensus in strategic decision making in a situation having strong controver­
sies. As this case demonstrates, strategic decision making involves more than generating 
alternatives and making a choice. It is a delicate negotation process about different opinions 
held by various people. Perception and interpretation are core elements of this process.
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As a result, a GDSS to support these processes cannot rely solely on technology. It will 
always be largely facilitator dependent. Although some experiments indicate that groups 
without facilitation perform equally well as facilitated groups (e.g., George et al. 1992), 
it is hard to imagine that this would have been the case in this project (quite the contrary). 
As stated, the group had been discussing the “fleet problem” for over a year without being 
able to arrive at a consensus. The group clearly found itself in a blind alley. It is doubtful 
whether the group would have progressed so quickly without an outside facilitator. The 
importance of the faciliator thus strongly depends on the type of problem and the organiza­
tional circumstances.
As I have pointed out before, from a model-builder’s perspective, the model was never 
really finished. Some people raise the question whether the model is valid or whether valid 
conclusions can be drawn without computer simulations. They refer to research in behavioral 
decision making which has demonstrated the human mind’s lack of computational capacity. 
(Hogarth 1987.) As a result, it is impossible to identify the dynamic consequences of changes 
in a complex system (see Forrester 1987; Sterman 1989a and b). However, to approach 
the situation from this point of view is to miss the point. The model in this case must be 
considered a “requisite decision model” (Phillips 1984). It is the result of a shared social 
reality, which forms the basis for action. In this case, the problem was not so much to 
find the “right” strategic decision, as to overcome the deadlock and to arrive at consensus 
and create commitment. This case description also reveals that this is a subtle process in 
which a balance has to be found between a socially negotiated order and the negotiated 
social order (Eden 1992a). The evaluation results show that various elements of a GDSS 
contribute to this result in intricate ways. More in-depth research of actual field applica­
tions is needed to increase our understanding of these processes, the way various elements 
in a GDSS affect them, and how they contribute to the success of a GDSS.
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Note
1. Note that these results are, in fact, better than they might initally appear to be, due to the fact that the state­
ment was formulated in an extreme way, i.e., “I ju lly  stick to the conclusions we formulated,” rather than 
the less extreme, “I stick to the conclusions we formulated.” Also note that one answer is missing.
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